The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success

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Standard

The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. / Rasmussen, Anne; Reh, Christine.

I: Journal of European Public Policy, Bind 20, Nr. 7, 01.08.2013, s. 1006-1024.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Rasmussen, A & Reh, C 2013, 'The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success', Journal of European Public Policy, bind 20, nr. 7, s. 1006-1024. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.795391

APA

Rasmussen, A., & Reh, C. (2013). The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(7), 1006-1024. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.795391

Vancouver

Rasmussen A, Reh C. The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. Journal of European Public Policy. 2013 aug. 1;20(7):1006-1024. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.795391

Author

Rasmussen, Anne ; Reh, Christine. / The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. I: Journal of European Public Policy. 2013 ; Bind 20, Nr. 7. s. 1006-1024.

Bibtex

@article{2f969d0769b94cdcb19cd3fb39e0ce2a,
title = "The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success",
abstract = "One of the most important changes in the history of codecision has been the steep increase in early agreements since 1999. Early agreements have enhanced the efficiency of European Union legislation, but they have been criticized for giving a subset of actors disproportionate control over the legislative agenda and negotiation process. Yet, no study has systematically shown whether and how early agreements have indeed redistributed influence between actors within the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Our contribution fills this gap by comparing actors{\textquoteright} bargaining success across readings under codecision in a dataset of salient files. Contrary to our theoretical predictions, we do not find evidence of distributional consequences when controlling for inter-institutional conflict and file characteristics. Where codecision is concluded early, the final legislative outcomes are not located closer to the policy positions held by the party group of the Parliament's rapporteur or by the Council Presidency.",
keywords = "Bargaining success, codecision, early agreements, party groups, presidency, rapporteur",
author = "Anne Rasmussen and Christine Reh",
year = "2013",
month = aug,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1080/13501763.2013.795391",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "1006--1024",
journal = "Journal of European Public Policy",
issn = "1350-1763",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "7",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success

AU - Rasmussen, Anne

AU - Reh, Christine

PY - 2013/8/1

Y1 - 2013/8/1

N2 - One of the most important changes in the history of codecision has been the steep increase in early agreements since 1999. Early agreements have enhanced the efficiency of European Union legislation, but they have been criticized for giving a subset of actors disproportionate control over the legislative agenda and negotiation process. Yet, no study has systematically shown whether and how early agreements have indeed redistributed influence between actors within the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Our contribution fills this gap by comparing actors’ bargaining success across readings under codecision in a dataset of salient files. Contrary to our theoretical predictions, we do not find evidence of distributional consequences when controlling for inter-institutional conflict and file characteristics. Where codecision is concluded early, the final legislative outcomes are not located closer to the policy positions held by the party group of the Parliament's rapporteur or by the Council Presidency.

AB - One of the most important changes in the history of codecision has been the steep increase in early agreements since 1999. Early agreements have enhanced the efficiency of European Union legislation, but they have been criticized for giving a subset of actors disproportionate control over the legislative agenda and negotiation process. Yet, no study has systematically shown whether and how early agreements have indeed redistributed influence between actors within the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Our contribution fills this gap by comparing actors’ bargaining success across readings under codecision in a dataset of salient files. Contrary to our theoretical predictions, we do not find evidence of distributional consequences when controlling for inter-institutional conflict and file characteristics. Where codecision is concluded early, the final legislative outcomes are not located closer to the policy positions held by the party group of the Parliament's rapporteur or by the Council Presidency.

KW - Bargaining success

KW - codecision

KW - early agreements

KW - party groups

KW - presidency

KW - rapporteur

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2013.795391

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2013.795391

M3 - Journal article

VL - 20

SP - 1006

EP - 1024

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

SN - 1350-1763

IS - 7

ER -

ID: 66282352