

The Effect of Political Campaigns
– Overview of the research Online Panel of Electoral Campaigning (OPEC)

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Abstract

There are many somewhat competing models for measuring political campaign effects. This paper discusses six types of campaign effects.

- 1) The *civic engagement* effect that argues people will learn and become more political engaged due to the campaign.
- 2) The *priming studies* argue that campaigns affect what issues the voters evaluate the parties and leaders on and sequentially their vote.
- 3) The *minimal effect models* argue that campaigns only mobilize existing prepositions and voters only seek to confirm their intermediated vote choice.
- 4) The *memory based models* argue that the vote choice is based on sampling of the available information filtered through the voters' predisposition and in the light of their political awareness and sophistication.
- 5) *Online based models* argue that voters continuously incorporate the political discourses in their vote choice and then soon forget these discourses.
- 6) The *shortcut based models* highlight the various shortcuts to political choice (e.g. basic likes and dislikes).

By reviewing how the models are applied in the literature the paper aims to focus on how the models are presented theoretically and carried out empirical, as well as on the validity between the theoretical considerations and empirical data. Finally, the paper presents how these models are operationalized in the questionnaires and experiments of the project Online Panel of Electoral Campaigning (OPEC).

The paper is part of a five years research project, OPEC, which is set out to measure campaign effect during the next national election for the Danish parliament. The project began in January 2008. This paper presents the general idea of the project and operationalized various classic models of campaign effects. The draft questionnaire is also included. The online-web-panel will run during the next election in Denmark, which will be held no later than February 2011.

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Political campaigns

Norris (2000), echoed by many, has suggested that political parties today are in a situation of permanent campaigning. That is, as the media are becoming more fragmented and competitive and voters increasingly are becoming less tied to one particular party with increased number of party switchers as a consequence, parties have become more professional. On the one hand, the parties have become professional by introducing a systematic use of political opinion polls and focus groups in their planning of the political message and its wrapping. On the other hand parties have become professional by employing an increased number of professionals (e.g. pollster, spin-doctors and campaigners) in order to manage the media and strategic focus of the political message to maximize the number of votes.

Campaign spending has increased dramatically over the recent elections, but our knowledge of whether this money has any effect on the voters is very limited. Basically there is no systematic studies of the various effect of the political campaign in Denmark even through the spending today is well above DDK 100 million DKK (about 13.5 million euros) in the last election in Denmark¹ (Hansen & Pedersen 2008).

This project tries to estimate to what extent the campaign matter. That is, does the campaign influence the voters' political preferences and their civic engagement?

What is a political election campaign?

If we want to measure any effect of election campaign we first of all need to specify and define in time and context what a campaign is. As a minimum the Election Day must be known, the names of the main parties and candidates must be made public and the parties and candidates must be able to fully invest their time in the campaign (Brady et al. 2006).

In Denmark it is possible for the prime minister to call a national election at any time he decides, within a period of four years. For practical concerns this is usually done three weeks before the election². Usually the main parties and candidates are known well in advance of this date³. The Danish parliament usually does not hold any meetings after the election date is called, thus the parties should be able to give the campaign their full attention.

¹ Most recently Bernt Aardal, Anne Krogstad and Hanne Marthe Narud (2004) edited a book on the Norwegian campaign which probably is the most systematic study of a Nordic campaign. Studies on electoral campaigning in Scandinavian are quite rare. Nevertheless, there are a few recent exceptions available in English (e.g. Aalberg & Jenssen 2007; Buch & Hansen 2002; de Vreese 2004; de Vreese & Semetko 2004; Jenssen & Aalberg 2006; Stromback & Aalberg 2008; Stromback & Dimitrova 2006).

² However the 1966, 1990, 1998 and 2001 elections were called only 20 days before the elections.

³ According to the election law the deadline for parties are 15 days and the deadline for candidates are 10 days before the Election Day.


Therefore in the Danish case, defining the election campaign from the date when the election is called seems unproblematic.

However, what is more problematic is to define the factors within these three weeks of campaign that are relevant to measure in order to analyze campaign effects. A broad definition could be the information which the voters find relevant for their vote choice. Another could be any direct advertising and campaign activities done by parties and candidates (incl. interest's organization and unions etc.) including the media's treatment of the various political messages and issues. Surveying the voters on issue saliency, monitoring the media and the parties campaign activities is usually the operationalization of the campaign (e.g. Sciarini & Kriesi 2003).

Two analysis of campaign effects (pilot study)

One way to provide an indication of whether campaigns matter is found in figure 1 below. The curve showing numbers of voters deciding during the campaign indicates that more and more voters decide during the political campaign. That is the last three weeks before the election.

Figure 1: Denmark: Decision time and change during campaign (in percent)



In the 2007 campaign 43 percent of the voters decided what party to support during the campaign whereas this number was only 14 in 1971. Compared to the other Nordic countries


Denmark is an outlier as Norway had 56, Sweden had 58, Finland 51 and Iceland had XX percent who decided during the campaign at the last general election.

The first conclusion follows that as more and more voters indicate that they make their decision during the campaign it become more important. However according to the curve showing net movement during the campaign there is no general tendency to that the net movement between the parties has increased in the same period during the campaign⁴. Even through voters indicate that they increasingly decide during the campaign, the result is not more electoral change in the same period. This suggests that the minimal effect is at play here (see below).

But campaigns might cause effects on civic engagement. To illustrate this point figure 2 shows how the political efficacy items developed during the 2005 election campaign.

⁴ Nevertheless the Swedish election surveys suggest that there is a strong correlation between party switchers and number of voter deciding during the campaign. The Pearson's correlation between number of party switchers and decided during the campaign in the Danish case is 0.46 and in the Swedish case 0.97. (Own calculation based on the election surveys). Why such a difference? That the Swedish's estimates rely more on panel data and the Danish more on recall data do not seem to account for the large difference. One explanation might be that in Denmark you can those to put your mark on the ballot on the party OR a person (usually running for the parties). In Sweden you have to mark a person, so you cannot just put your mark next to the party. In this way the question: "When did you decide what to vote?" is different in the two countries. In Denmark you have to decide on party and then whether or not to vote personally (52% did that in 2007 election) in Sweden you have to take the decision between the various candidates. Furthermore number of parties, the parties' closeness to each other and number of dimension in politics might help understand the difference.

Figure 2: Feeling of trust, responsiveness and competence during a campaign for the 2005 national election for the Danish parliament



Generally speaking the voters' own confidence in being able to debate politics and their feeling of political responsiveness increases during the campaign whereas the trust in the political leaders decreases during the campaign. That is more and more people believe they are competent to debate politics and that they have an influence on the political system as the campaign progress where as fewer and fewer people trust the political leaders. In this way we see an increase in political responsiveness and feeling of competence and a decrease in trust as the campaign progress.

The minimum number of interviews in figure 2 is 24 ranging up to 203 observations pr. (day) with a total number of answers adding up to 1.975, 1.989 and 1.984 on each of the three items - excluding missing. The total of 2.000 interviews is a simple random sampling on known telephone numbers in Denmark. The interview is done by CATI (Hansen 2007a).

However it is not a true rolling-cross-sectional design as each sample is not random. E.g. some of fluctuation might be caused by that education among the respondents also increase in the period due to sampling. However, time can only account for 11% (R2) with regard to increased education compared to the much higher R2 in figure 2, so the self-

selectiveness of the sampling can only partly account for the fluctuations⁵. Furthermore, the number of interviews in each period fluctuates. This fluctuation causes some periods to be estimated with higher measurement error than others which the model does not account for. In addition, the time interval between the observations varies as e.g. very few interviews are conducted during the weekends. Nevertheless, other before me has treated traditional samples in this way (e.g. Bartels 2006a; Slothuus 2008).

The next section discusses several of the effects a campaign might be able to cause.

The effect of election campaigns

It is possible to divide the effects of a political campaign into six broad and somewhat overlapping hypotheses of campaign effects: 1) civic engagement 2) priming 3) minimal effect 4) memory based models 5) online based models 6) shortcut based models. The first effect is concerned with the democratic potential of a campaign, the second with the campaign's agenda setting power. The four latter ones are all directly concerned with the effect on the political preferences of the voters. I will now discuss each one of the effects, set up hypotheses and define what survey variable/questions will be needed to analyze them.

1. Civic engagement

Effects of civic engagement come as increases in political interest, awareness, knowledge and the likelihood to vote⁶. Freedman et al. (2004) find that exposure to the campaign increase all of the above and in this sense the campaign is important, as it brings voters closer to a normative ideal of an informed and political engaged public. Craig et al. (2005) find that voters increase, their knowledge of the candidate's positions during the campaign, but also the gap between the most knowledgeable and less knowledgeable tend to increase during the campaign. Nevertheless Freedman et al. (2004) work suggest that the knowledge gap tend to decrease during campaign. Also Norris et al. (1999) show how voters learn moderately during the election campaign. That is, even through there is strong evidence that the campaign increases voters' political knowledge there is still a controversy on increasing or decreasing knowledge gap of the campaign. Furthermore, there is still much work to be done on which

⁵ Only in the case of "People like me don't have any say about what the government does" education is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) when included in the regression (Both if education is included alone or with all the others). However it does not cancel the strong effect of time (that is the campaign) out.

⁶ It has been argued that if campaigns are negative they will make voters less engaged and more likely to abstain from voting (Ansolabehere et al. 1994). However many studies have recently not been able to find this disengaging effect of negative campaigns (Brooks 2006; Hansen & Pedersen 2008).

elements (e.g. direct advertisement or media treatment of the political messages) in the campaign causes the voters' substantive information boots (Iyengar & Simon 2000).

One way of capturing and conceptualizing the effect on civic engagement is to use the well-known concept of political efficacy split into internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy is concerned with the political competence and possibility to relate to the political system (e.g. knowledge), whereas external efficacy is concerned with the voters' trust towards the political system and the extent to which voters feel that the system is responsive (Kam 2007; Lane 1959:149; Miller et al. 1980: 253). Broadly speaking the political efficacy is a general 'health check' on democracy and in this sense applied to analyze how political efficacy is affected during the campaign.

This brings us to the project's first general hypothesis. The political efficacy hypothesis: *Political efficacy increases during the campaign.*

That is, over the campaign we will see how the voters will increase their efficacy and political knowledge, but due to selective attention we will also expect voters to learn the most about parties and candidates they have sympathies for.

In relation to knowledge the rich-become-richer thesis suggests that the voters mostly aware of the campaign will learn the most and as these voters also initially are the ones with the highest level of political knowledge it is expected that the knowledge gap will increase during the campaign. Normatively speaking this suggests that even through the campaign increases knowledge; it also causes increased inequality with regard to political knowledge among the voters.

The dependent variable in hypothesis 1: civic engagement is measured by political efficacy (the four-six traditional items), interest (one traditional item) and political knowledge (several campaign message knowledge items and general political knowledge). Political awareness is measured by asking about voters' exposure to news and the campaign. Traditional items such as party choice, party and party leader' sympathies are also included.

2. Priming

Large amount of studies focus on the campaign's agenda setting power. That is, to what extent does the campaign prime the individual by telling them what issues they should evaluate the candidates on? That is priming studies. Several studies have shown how the agenda of the campaign affects the voters' issue saliency (Iyengar & Simon 1993; Togeby 2007). That is,

the issues the voters find most important. The priming effect is an indirect effect as priming studies seldom study the vote choice directly, but rather how issues increase their saliency in the voters' evaluation of parties and leaders and only secondly try to capture how this priming of issues effects the vote choice. In this way priming analyzes, not what we vote, but what issues we evaluate the parties and candidates on. E.g. de Vreese (2004) shows how the issues of a referendum campaign causes voters to evaluate the leading politicians' performance on the issue of the campaign. Johnston et al. (1992) show how the issue of free trade increased its saliency during the campaign and how the voters' evaluation of the candidates on free trade had a strong impact on their vote choice.

This brings us to the project's second general hypothesis. The priming hypothesis: *The agenda during camping (combined party and media) affects the issue saliency of the voter. The parties which according to the voters perform best on the salient issues will experience an increase in the number of vote, as well as an increased party sympathy during the campaign and vice versa.*

Central variables included here are issue saliency on a fixed set of issues combined with a set of issues directly related to the campaign. The voters' stand on the issue, its importance and how the voters think the parties perform on the issue is included. Traditional items of party choice, party and party leader sympathy are also included.

3. Minimal effect

The basic conclusion of the early pioneer studies in campaign effects was that the campaign had very limited effect on vote choice (Schmitt-Beck 2007: 753). Campaigns only reinforce an initial choice by mobilizing the predisposition and the strong party identification. As predisposition and party identification were quite stable factors so was the vote choice regardless of the campaign. In this sense the campaign only reassured the voters of their choice by activating a stable set of dimension, in the vote choice (Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). Later on other studies have highlighted the selective nature of voters' perception and recollection of the campaign tending to reinforce the intermediated choice. E.g. liberals tend to focus on the liberal news channels (exposure) and they primarily tend to process and remember liberal frames (perception) of the issues, which ultimately only reinforce and do not challenge the liberals vote choice (Festinger 1957; Hansen 2004; Iyengar 1990; Kinder & Sears 1985). Elsewhere I have shown how the voters

which are inclined to vote no tend to learn the factual premises supporting the no in a referendum campaign and vice versa (Hansen 2008b). Hansen & Pedersen (2008) also show how voters tend to explore the website of the parties they are inclined to agree with. So what basically happen during a campaign is that, the voters seek conformation of an initial hunch of party choice. This might be exactly what happens in the previous analyzed (figure 1) Danish election campaigns where the level of electoral change and number of voters deciding during the campaign does not correlate as strong as the Swedish case (see figure 1).

This brings us to the third hypothesis. The minimal effect: *The political campaign reinforces initial party choice by mobilizing predisposition, party identification and this mechanism is reinforced by the voters' selective attention and perception of politics.*

That is, during the campaign we will see an increased correlation between predisposition, party identification and party choice. The variables are predisposition (left-right & materialism – postmaterialism), party ID and party choice, party and party leader sympathy are also included.

4. Memory based models

The fourth effect of the campaign is the so-called memory based models that argue that the vote choice is based on sampling of the available information filtered through the voters' predisposition in light of their political awareness and sophistication (Price & Zaller 1993; Zaller 1992). That is, when the voter is exposed (which is a function of political awareness) to the message she will try to recollect how this message fits her predisposition (which is a function of the political sophistication to recall memory) and then provide an evaluation of the party or candidate. The voter will resist messages that are inconsistent with their predisposition, but only if the voters have the knowledge and sophistication that allow them to access this message in light of their predisposition (Sciarini & Kriesi 2003).

This brings us to the fourth hypothesis. The memory based model: *The political campaign affects the voters as a function of their predisposition, political awareness and political knowledge.*

Specifically the stronger the predisposition and political knowledge are and the lower the political awareness are, the less likely it is that we see any effect of the campaign. The

variables are predisposition, awareness to the news and the campaign and political knowledge. Again, party vote, party sympathy and party leader sympathy is included as the basic dependent variables.

The big challenge to this model is that voters forget a lot and very quickly within days after exposure to a campaign message. Many voters cannot recall basic campaign messages (Lodge et al. 1995) and many studies have shown that voters perform badly when their political knowledge are surveyed (Althaus 2003; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996; Hansen 2008a). If voters cannot recall basic campaign information how can it have any effect?

5. Online based models

As the memory for campaign messages fade out very quickly and we rely on the memory based model we must conclude that voters are very uninformed and unaware when making their political choice. However, the online based model provides another interpretation. The online based models argue that voters continuously incorporate the political discourses in their vote choice and then soon forget these discourses. Campaign messages are processed as soon as they are encountered and then forgotten. Whereas the voters forget remarkably quickly the campaign messages the voters' overall evaluations of the candidate are very stable (Lodge et al. 1989; Lodge et al. 1995). Recent experimental research supports the strength of the online based model as on-line processing create stronger and more clear cut opinions than memory-based models (Bizer et al. 2006). Matthes et al. (2007) try to differentiate between on-line processing and memory-based models simply by asking the respondents how they think when they give an answer in the poll. They find that voters with primary on-line judgment provide more polarized opinions, provide faster answers, and have stronger opinion confidence than voters with memory-based judgment.

This brings us to the fifth hypothesis. The online based model: *The voters' memories of the campaign messages fade out quickly, but as the messages are processed continuously their effect can be measured on the voters' political preferences.*

Variables are general knowledge and campaign message knowledge and party vote, party sympathy and party leader sympathy is included as the basic dependent variables.

6. *Shortcut based models*

The six and final effect of the campaign is based on the *shortcut based models*, which highlight the various shortcuts or cues to political choice. E.g. politicians' charisma, trust, and credibility or simple affective likes and dislikes (Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al. 1991). The shortcuts are often conceptualized as political heuristic such as the candidate's party affiliation or ideology. The voters then rely on stereotypical understanding, of parties and candidates and are not learning what each candidate or party specifically propose during the campaign or in their manifesto. Another shortcut is endorsements or recommendations. Instead of going to the party and trying to understand what the party stands for, the voter can simply take endorsement of the e.g. the trade union, trusted newspapers, interest organization or rely on recommendation from friends, colleagues and family. The voter could also rely on the various opinion polls as basic information in their vote choice or simply the candidates' appearance (Lau & Redlawsk 2001). Lau & Redlawsk (2001) demonstrate how the use of heuristics are much applied by all voters, but also that the use increases by the complexity of the vote choice. Rosar et al. (2008) show how the heuristic of appearance matters as attractive candidates receives higher polls especially if they compete against unattractive candidates.

The conclusion to be drawn from the shortcut model is that voters apply various heuristic shortcuts in order to make political choices. That is, even though voters cannot recollect basic campaign information they are capable of making a choice based on stereotypical understanding of party ideology, the political recommendations from their environment, opinion polls or simply the looks and appearance of the candidates.

This brings us to the final and sixth hypothesis of the project. The shortcut model: *Votes rely much on political heuristic when making political choice.*

Personal characteristic of the party leader explain more in the political preference than current party politics. Stereotypical classification of parties according to ideology explain more of the political preference than current party politics

Variables are personal appearance of party leader, parties' placement on stereotype ideology and parties' stand on campaign issue. The endorsement thesis will not be tested.

Method – a five wave panel design with control groups

Panel design has been the core of many election studies from Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) and beyond. The points with panel designs are that you can analyze individual changes and not only aggregate changes as with traditional cross-sectional design. However often each wave of the panel design was in the field for months at the time and each wave was separated by years, thus making it very difficult to link specific events during the campaign or media directly to any changes in the electoral opinion.

Secondly the panel-design is effected by the so called Socratic or panel effect which causes the panel slowly to move away from the general public's intermediate public opinion and thus become unrepresentative of the electoral in general (Bartels 1999; Hill & Kriesi 2001). When asking a person the same or similar questions repeatedly the respondent becomes, not only more aware of the questions, but may also start to engage him self in the issue by following the media or discussing more closely with friends (Campbell & Stanley 1963; Hansen 2004).

Finally the panel design is effect by panel mortality, i.e. from wave to wave there is a drop out and this drop out is not random as it often consists of the less politically interested and aware. Therefore the panel loses its representativeness as time goes by (Bartels 2006b).

The methodological challenge has lately been confronted by two approaches: the experimental design and the rolling-cross-section. The experimental design, when carried out as survey experiment has the advantage of allowing for full control of the stimulus and at the same time achieve representativeness of the voters (Ansolabehere 2006; Hansen 2007b; Slothuus 2007; Sniderman & Grob 1996). However, the challenge to the survey experiments is whether the isolated effect of the stimulus can be generalized to the huge amount of complex and intense stimuli that goes on during a political campaign in real life.

The rolling-cross-section is a survey that conducts e.g. 60-100 interviews daily during the campaign. This allows the researcher to follow the voters' responses to the campaign, but only on the aggregated level. As respondents are only interviewed once changes cannot be analyzed directly on the individual level. On the other hand, as respondents are only interviewed once you do not have the panel effect or the panel mortality to deal with (Brady & Johnston 2006; Johnston & Brady 2002). As only relative few interviews are conducted daily the aggregated estimate of any change will tend to be very conservative and

due to the relative small daily sample size most reported changes would tend to be statistically insignificant.

This study applies a web-based panel design allowing thousands of interviews to be completed within hours⁷. Thus, allowing at least in time relating elements in the ongoing campaign to the voters' opinions and their individual change. Furthermore, as suggested by Bartels (1999; 2006b), the panel-design includes some fresh cross-sectional interviews which are unexposed to any panel effects. This complex web-based panel design is illustrated in figure 2.

These fresh and single wave interviews allow estimating whether there are any panel effects due to repeated measurement, and secondly, allow correcting for measurement errors due to correlation between the error term(s) and the independent variables. It is also possible to correct for measurement error by using the information you have because you have asked the identical questions in each wave.⁸

Figure 2 about here

⁷ There has been much talk about the representativeness of web-surveys, but online campaign surveys have been implemented with great success in Sweden, Australian and the UK (Dahlberg et al. 2006; Gibson & McAllister 2002; Winters 2006). That is, with careful recruitment and internet access close to 90% of the voters in Denmark in should be possible to conduct representative surveys (Lee 2006). Furthermore a quota-sampling (pre-stratification) combined with an iterative post-weighting procedure on gender, age, geography and party choice will secure representativeness of the sample (Alvarez et al. 2003; Schoen & Faas 2005). Comparison of CAPI (Computer-Assisted-Personal-Interview) and web-based interview tend only to find minor differences when it come to key variables such a vote choice and turnout (Sanders et al. 2007). At least part of the national election survey in Denmark conducted after the 2007 election will be based on web-interviews.

⁸ Lately it has been widely accepted that multiple regressions models often are affected by measurement error (Achen 1975; Beck 2001; Beck & Katz 1995). Measurement error is the error by which the independent variables predict the dependent variable. In OLS regression this error must be random and constant over time (i.e. avoid heteroscedasticity) and furthermore must the independent variables be uncorrelated over time (i.e. avoid autocorrelation). Especially in panel data these assumptions will almost always be violated. The quest is to figure out how we can use the non-random measurement error and correlated independent variable over time to improve our models and thus including as much information from the variables as possible.

Katz & Bech (2001; 1995) suggest using a panel correction for standard errors (xtpcse in Stata) which correct for correlated variables and correlated error terms. The idea in the panel design is to use the correlation across waves among the independents variables error terms to adjust for this measurement error in the analysis.

While Bartel (1999) suggests the calculating instrumental variables (IV) to be included in panel designs in order to correct for measurement errors and panel effects. The idea by introduced IV is that it allows correcting for independents variable correlations with the error term and thus producing consistent and unbiased estimates. An IV is a variable which is correlated with the independent variables, but not the error term and are often implemented by the use of two-stage least-squares (2SLS) by the use of Stata 'xtivreg' for panel design (Bartels 1991; Franklin 1989).

I don't know if it is possible to do both simultaneous or a good idea in this case. I will focus on the former model as its implementation is straighter forward.

Generally speaking, what is being modeled in all of the above six hypotheses is changes. That is, to what extent can changes in the independent variables account for changes in the dependent variable. Party vote is a nominal variable, which makes it difficult to model, and secondly, the previous election has taught us that only around 25% change party between elections. Thus the variable has little variation. Party sympathy and party leader sympathy on the other hand allow each voter to rate every party and party leader on an interval scale allowing more straightforward panel model to be applied. Furthermore we have much more variation in this variable.

Conclusion

Well, it is hard to write a conclusion before having gathered the neither data nor analyzed data. However I hope that each of the two first hypotheses can be written up as two articles, whereas the last four hypotheses can be included to one 'overarching' article when it comes to campaign effects. To some extent all of the hypothesis will probably be able to account for some variation.

The more pressing problem is that the questionnaire is probably too long and I need to drop some questions and thus not be able to analyses all six hypotheses. It should only take about 10 minutes to fill out on the web as that is what the funding and the contract with the survey-company (TNS-GALLUP) allows.

Figure 2: Illustration of Online Panel of Electoral Campaigning (OPEC)

	Before campaign	Week 1 of the campaign	Week 2 of the campaign	Week 3 of the campaign	3 days before election	3 days after election
Danish election web-survey, February 2007, n=2500 (1 hr interview). (randomly split into the Tuesday and Friday)		Tuesday panel	Tuesday panel	Tuesday panel	Tuesday panel	Tuesday panel
Recruitment of 2000 respondents (randomly split into the Tuesday and Friday)			Friday panel	Friday panel	Friday panel	Friday panel
Provide the possibility to correct for panel effects and conduct experiment on campaign messages	Recruitment of 2000 respondents	Single wave				
	Recruitment of 2000 respondents			Single wave		
	Recruitment of 2000 respondents					Single wave

Each wave must (excluding stimulus) take on average 10 minutes to complete due to funding.

I haven't said much about the experimental part of the design. The basic idea is simple to conduct some split-sample experiments where the respondents are exposed to real elements from the campaign such as parties' videos, ads and campaign messages.

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