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Leaving the nest and the social act of voting

- revisiting the relationship between age and turnout among first-time voters

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Abstract

With departure in a unique dataset with complete public record data of more than 145.000 young adults we show that contrary to common belief, the relationship between age and turnout among youngest eligible individuals is not monotonic positive, but strongly negative until the age of 20 years. We also offer an explanation for this pattern – changing social influences as the youngster leave the nest of their parents. Parents' turnout influence the young adult's turnout and youngsters who live at home vote more than their average peer. The two effects are conditioned on each other. Living at home has a negative effect on turnout if the parents do not vote, but the effect is strongly positive if the parents do vote. Finally, when adolescents leave home, the influence of the high voting parents decreases while the influence of the less voting peers increases. This partly explains the surprising negative relationship between turnout and age and indicates that though political socialization indeed matters, part of the parental influence on young adults stems from voting being a social act.

"An analysis of interviews with people of very low motivation who have gone to the polls indicates that the most important force on their behavior is interpersonal influence" (The American Voter, Campbell et al. 1960:109).

Introduction

Across established democratizes young citizens vote substantially less than older and more established ones (e.g. Phelps 2004; Wass 2007; Sloam 2007). Understanding youth abstention is important as voting has strong habitudinal properties (e.g. Campbell et al. Franklin 2004; Gerber et al. 2003; Denny & Doyle 2009). If the youth is not mobilized, it may have long-term consequences for political participation in general (Gallego 2009).

In the existing literature, there is universal agreement that turnout and age are positively related for young and middle-aged individuals (e.g. Fieldhouse et al. 2007). We question this conventional wisdom. Furthermore, the previous literature on youth voting has been particularly preoccupied with the transitional nature of adult life, in particular the acquirement of adult roles such as marriage and leaving school (Abramson et al 1998; Highton & Wolfinger 2001). However, few studies have thoroughly empirically examined the possibly most profound transition during adulthood - the gradual detachment from parents' and the increasing influence of peers (Highton & Wolfinger 2001; Plutzer 2002). In this paper, we examine to what extent do parental influence decline, do peers become important, and what are the consequences for turnout?

We utilize a unique dataset from the Danish municipal election in November 2009 to provide insight into the turnout of young first-time-voters. The dataset contains validated public records of turnout of all voters in 44 municipality as well as detailed government

issued socio-demographical information for more than 2.3 million individuals (145.785 of those were under 22 years old – i.e. first-time voters at municipal elections). This allows for substantially more fine gained analysis of age and turnout than previous possible as well as more reliable estimates due to the use of public voting records and government issued data on the independent variables rather than self-reported voting and other survey instruments that are known to be prone to systematic bias (Bernstein et al. 2001; Karp & Brockington 2005).

The first part of the paper descriptively examines turnout as a function of age. Though the young adult on average votes less than eligible citizens in general, there is not a positive, linear relationship between age and turnout within young voters, as commonly believed in the literature (e.g. Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Wass 2007). In fact, during the first years of eligibility, there is a remarkably strong negative relationship.

The second part of the paper focuses on factors that explain the observed (and surprising) empirical patterns. We specifically look at the consequences of leaving home due to changes in parental and peer influence. These factors are difficult to study without access to complete government databases on the dependent variable (turnout) and the very detailed and reliable independent variables. We find that the overall effect of leaving the nest is negative – however, strongly conditional on the parents' turnout. We also examine the relative influences of parents and peers on those adolescents who have in fact left home. The youngsters seem to be at least as affected by their peers compared to their parents. It thus seems that young adults leaving home and becoming less affected by their parents' high turnout levels and more affected by their peers low turnout levels explain a large part of the observed negative relationship between age and turnout during the first years of

eligibility. In a broader perspective, the importance of whom you live with indicates that short term socialization processes (such as the social element of the voting act itself and political discussions up to elections), is equally as important for turnout as primary political socialization. In other words, the social component of turnout is important. Finally, we reconsider a range of prominent hypotheses in suggested the literature.

The social act of voting

In this paper we argue that voting is very much a social act. The primary social network the citizen is engaged in heavily influences whether she turns out or not. Such social networks can be the family, the educational system and after leaving the nest the new household (Lane 1959:204). This idea is not new. Campbell et al. (1960: 109) indicated that interpersonal relationships are crucial when it come to the act of voting. A similar observation was made by Lazarsfeld et al. (1968:137): "Repeatedly in this study we found indications that people vote "in groups". The line of argument has recently gained renewed attention as captured by Zuckerman (2005) in his review of "The Social Logic of Politics" (see also Beck et al. 2002; Zuckerman et al. 2007; Nickerson 2008).

The primary social network is not constant over the course of the political life-cycle. One of the most profound changes in social ties during the political lifecycle is during adolescence. Social ties are disrupted when the young adult leaves the nest of the parents and new social network are being activated. If primary social networks matter, reconfiguration of social ties should be consequential for turnout. As Eulau (1986:38) puts it: "Political behavior is likely to vary with the type of groups in which the individual is involved". That is, at different stages in the political lifecycle, different social pressures are at play, and thus lead to different political behavior. The gradual detachment from the social influence of parents

and the increasing influence of peers, partners etc. may be consequential for turnout as leaving the nest often implies being influenced by a new social network that votes less than the parents.

Only few studies empirically investigate the effects of reconfiguration of family ties on political participation. One exception is Stoker and Jennings (1995)'s seminal study that show that married couples become more similar in terms of participation after marriage. To our knowledge only one study empirically examines the effect of leaving the nest of the parents on young adults' turnout (Highton & Wolfinger 2001). However, the scope of this study was restricted by data limitations as – most importantly its inability to match the turnout behavior of youngsters and their parents. In this study, we elaborate further.

The Danish electoral system and the data

Our data is from 44 different local elections held simultaneously across Denmark on the 17 November 2009. In each of the municipalities the entire electoral register has been computerized and then merged with extensive lists of socio-demographic statistics from Statistics Denmark[1]. Our data is based on actual turnout (full and validated public records) and government issued individual level socio-demographical information and not self-reported data from surveys.

Denmark consists of 98 municipalities which are responsible for most welfare services (e.g., childcare, elementary schools, care for seniors, libraries etc). A total of 27% of the GDP – or roughly half of all public spending - is administered by the municipalities

[1] Statistics Denmark is official census bureau funded by the government and has the responsibility of compiling statistics from various Danish authorities on all levels.

(Mourtizen 2003; Bhatti & Hansen 2010). There are a fixed elections term with simultaneous elections across the country every fourth year in November. All municipalities have a multi-party electoral system with proportional voting - i.e. the number of party seats gained by each party is proportional with its share of the votes.[2]

We define turnout as the percentage votes cast divided by the size of the entire eligible electorate. In Denmark there is no registration involved - all eligible voters automatically receive a polling card by direct mail with information about the location of the polling station, the election date, and the time of voting. The eligible electorate is individuals who are at least 18 years old on Election Day and who have permanent residency in the municipality.[3]

The data are unique for the purpose. We have a total of 2,315,345 voters (145,785 of age 22 or younger) allowing for analyzing age groups what usually are normally too small to differentiate. Furthermore, we have the turnout information, addresses and family ties of all 2.3 mio. citizens, allowing us match voters with their parents regardless of whether they live together.

Revisiting the relationship between age and turnout

Previous research have documented that young voters abstain more than older ones in almost all established democracies around the globe (Highton & Wolfinger 2001; Phelps

[2] The turnout in the 2009 election was the lowest in 35 years with 65.8 percent. The election four years earlier had a turnout of 69.5 percent, and the last 11 local elections have had an average turnout at 71 percent with a standard deviation of just 5.6 percentage point.

[3] Furthermore, at least one of the following requirements has to be met: a) The person is a Danish citizen b) the person is a national of another member state of the European Union c) the person is a national of Iceland or Norway, or d) the person has uninterruptedly been permanently resident in Denmark for the past three years prior to the election. People under guardianship are disenfranchised.

2004; Wass 2007; Sloam 2007; Fieldhouse et al. 2007). As should be clear from the Figure 1 below, Denmark is no exception.

Figure 1: Turnout by collapse by age in years (2009)



Note: Average N per year is 28,151. Lowest N is 190 for 100 year olds. All eligible individuals for the 44 municipalities in the analysis are included.

On the surface, Figure 1 presents a classic (as e.g. Verba & Nie 1972; Fieldhouse et al. 2007) curve-linear relationship of how the young voters and the very elderly voters have low turnout. Eligible voters, of 20 to 24 year of age, have a turnout of 44%, whereas slightly above 80% of the eligible individuals in their mid-sixties turn out. However, when one looks closer at the very youngest citizens, a surprising relationship emerges. The youngest voters under 20 years have a much higher turnout than their older peers. This pattern is not due to sampling error since the number of voters is very large, and it is

furthermore based on full public records of all eligible citizens. The surprising pattern becomes even more evident, when we plot turnout (Figure 2) as a function of age on a weekly basis

Figure 2: Turnout collapsed by age week vise among first-time voters (below 22 years of age).



Note: Average N per week is 717. Regression line for first 52 weeks (where "week" is the number of weeks older than 18 years of age): Turnout=63.67-0.255*week (R-squared=0.73). Regression line for the entire period: Turnout=62.77-0.253*week +0.0008*week^2 (R-squared=0.89).

Figure 2 shows a largely linear negative relationship between age and turnout within the first years of eligibility. In fact, from the age of 18 to 19, each extra month of age is mirrored by a 1 percent turnout drop. From the age of 20 the turnout as a function of age stops declining. Then, after a small flat section, the turnout begins its expected increase (see Figure 1), but it does not reach the level of the 18 year olds before the age of 35 years.

This surprising finding has not previously been given attention in the literature. It requires an extremely large dataset to identify, and many studies simply collapses first-time voters or citizens under 25 years to one single group (Verba & Nie 1972:139; Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993:138; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980:38). Furthermore, few studies employ accurate, public record data. Nevertheless, a careful re-examination of several large, public records studies indicates that the surprising pattern is of more general nature. The finding is consistent with the Finish register based results by Wass (2007b: 651), where the 18 years olds vote 5.1, 6.5 and 5.8 percentage point *more* than the age group 19-20 years old in the three Finish national elections of 1979, 1987 and 1999. In the 1997 local elections in Denmark where similar data also are available we also see the same pattern (Elklit & Togeby 2009; Elklit et al. 2000; 2005). Additionally, Steinbrecher et al. (2007)'s public record data indicates that the 18-21 years old turn out about 5 percentage point more often that the 21 - 25 years olds across more than 17 German elections.[4]

In sum, contrary to common belief, there appears to be three phases in a life cycle, not two. The youngest actually vote substantially *more* than slightly other adolescents. After the beginning of the twenties, turnout increases until around the retirement age. Besides being empirically surprising, the first phase also challenges the theoretical idea that young adults start out as habitual non-voters and gradually acquires taste for voting proportional with the obtainment of adult roles (Highton & Wolfinger 2001; Plutzer 2002). In the remaining of

[4] We also found a similar pattern with survey data from European Parliament Elections available through the European Election Study 2009, which include national election surveys from the 27 EU-member countries. The 18 years olds vote 13 percentage points more than 19 years olds in a pooled analysis of all countries, with 27,069 respondents (182 respondents 18 years and old 368 19 years old), the difference is significant (two-tailed, p=0.03) (EES 2009, country weight engaged).

the paper, we discuss factors that that can explain this surprising first phase and point to the importance of reconfiguration of social ties during early adulthood as part of the answer.

Hypotheses

Main hypothesis: parental and peer influence

A prerequisite for the influence of leaving the nest and reconfiguration of social ties is that parents in the first place have some influence over their child. Parents are normally thought to have substantial influence over their children during primary socialization and are thus likely to transfer their turnout habits to the younger generation (e.g. Andolina et al. 2003). That is, reinforcement (or the opposite) of the voting norm among young voters can probably partly be attributed to parents' socialization as they constitute the young people's primary role models. Furthermore, newer studies have suggested that voting exhibits strong heritable traits which are genetically transferred from parents to child (Fowler & Dawes 2008; Fowler et al. 2008). In addition to primary socialization and genes, parents may also have a more immediate influence over their offspring through them being their primary social influence due to shared housing. That is, parental influence may both have a long-term and a short-term component.

Verba et al. (2005) show that parental socio-economic status and their turnout are among the most important variables in understanding young adults' turnout, while Plutzer (2002) finds that largest effect among a range of parental variables on first-time voters' turnout is parents' turnout. If the parent (in one-third of the cases the mother was interviewed, in one-third the father, and both parents in one-third) votes, the probability of that the first-time voters turn out increase from 0.45 to 0.66. Plutzer (2002)'s data from the 1960'ties are survey data and thus might be strongly polluted by social desirability causing an over-

reporting of turnout, which is not a problem in the present study. Pacheco & Plutzer (2007) also finds significant positive effects of parental vote on turnout among Whites and Hispanics, but not on African-Americans.

H1: The likelihood of voting increases if parents turn out

The dataset contains information about each respondent's legal parents' turnout and socio-demographic characteristics if they live in one of the 44 municipalities under investigation.

Only few empirical studies have empirically focused on the effect of residency with parents. However, as discussed in the introduction, leaving the nest is one of the most important transitions towards adulthood. Living at home may matter, simply because voting is often a social act in which the families go to the polls together. Nevertheless, previous studies find a moderate negative effect, supposedly because leaving home is one of the most important steps towards adulthood and thus one step closer settling down and maturing (Highton & Wolfinger 2001). If living with parents increase the likelihood of voting (and leaving the nest correspondingly decreases it), this could partly explain the surprising patterns observed in Figure 2.

H2: Living with ones parents increases the likelihood of voting among young adults

Living at home is operationalized as living at the same address as the parents (i.e. same municipality, same street and same street address).

Whereas the relationship between voting and living at home in previous studies is analyzed as an unconditional effect (Highton & Wolfinger 2001), a likely pattern would be that the effect of the factors described in H1 and H2 are not independent of each other (see also Plutzer 2002). In other words, leaving home may mean different things for different people. Living with parents should likely increase the influence of the parents' decision to vote on the young adults.[5] Second, when a young adult lives at home, she is directly confronted with the parents' decision to vote or not in that specific election. When the two generations live together, the likelihood increases that they will discuss the upcoming election (a short-term effect) and even go to the polling station together (an Election Day effect). That is, part of parental influence stems from the immediate social influence through living with the offspring.

H3: The effect of living with ones parents is conditional on whether the parents vote

The hypothesis can easily be operationalized as the interaction between the variables used for H1 and H2. Figure 3 provides some intriguing preliminary evidence for this hypothesis. The average influence of the parents on their offspring declines substantially during the years where the children leave home.

[5] Stoker and Jennings (1995) present a similar idea for marriage – the effect of marriage is conditional on whether the spouse votes.

Figure 3: Bivariate effect on turnout of having a voting father or mother compared to a non-voting one.



Note: The lines depict the effect of a parent voting compared to not voting predicted from logistic regressions with mothers' and fathers' turnout regressed on the young adults' turnout. N=564,461.

Parents are not the only ones who can influence the young voters. Political scientists have the recent years increasingly focused on peer effects on voting (e.g. Nickerson 2008). When a child grows older, peer groups, such as friends, co-workers, partners etc., may become increasingly influential relatively to parents (Plutzer 2002). In particular young citizens who are not living at home might be influenced by the non-family residents of their household. Friends or other roommates are theoretically interesting, as they do not affect primary socialization, as parents do, but they influence the young adult through political debate and to the extent that voting itself is a social event (Lane 1959:208). If peers influence the young adult after leaving the parents, this may also explain a possible

negative effect of leaving the nest, since peers (who are typically young) have a lower propensity to vote than parents.

H4: After leaving home, the likelihood of voting is related to the turnout of other members of the new household.

To examine this hypothesis, we specifically look at those individuals who are not living with either their parents nor living alone. The turnout of other members of the new household is found by taking the mean tendency to vote among all members of the household, eliminating the respondent herself.

Effects of other key social demographics

In addition to the main hypotheses, we consider for a range of factors, most of which are commonly discussed in the literature and are interesting by themselves. First, separate estimates of father's and mother's for H1 and H3 allows us to compare the relative influence of the two parents. It has also been suggested that women are more likely to be affected by other's opinions than men (Lane 1959; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980:40). We therefore include interactions between sex and parental as well as peer voting.

An alternative to H3 would be that becoming older per se diminishes parents' influence of the young adult's turnout. This could possibly explain the relationship depicted in Figure 3. The youngster just happens to leave home as she becomes older. To take into account this alternative, we include the interaction between parental voting and age.

A wide body of literature shows that residential mobility matters (e.g. Verba & Nie 1972: 145; Milbrath & Goel 1977:113; Highton & Wolfinger 2001). However, there are competing explanations for why this is so. First, registration increases the costs of voting. Second, disruption of community ties upon moving may disincentive the individual from voting. By examining a country where there is no registration, we are able to single out the later possible effect (see also Highton 2000). Considering residential mobility is important, since we want to single out the unique effect of moving from parents apart from the general effect of moving per se. Residential mobility/stability is operationalized as the days the respondent has lived at her current address. We also include a measure for time of residence in the municipality. This allows us to test whether moving constituency matters in addition to moving per se, even when there is no registration, due to less familiarity with politics in the new municipality.

Several studies (e.g. Highton & Wolfinger 2001; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980:57) are concerned by the influence of leaving education on voting. On the one hand, leaving the educational system may be a step towards adulthood. On the other hand, on the educational institutions the young may be encouraged to vote through social pressure and easier access to political information. A related issue is the effect of different types of education. Hillygus (2005) finds that higher verbal SAT scores and social science studies increase political participation. I.e. not only that students have higher turnout than non-students, but also that different education would have different effects. We examine both issues by including type of ongoing education in the regression.

We also consider the possibility that past eligibility influences turnout in the current election as suggested by Meredith (2009). This is done simply by including dummies for

turning 18 years old the 4 weeks up to and the 4 weeks after previous elections. If the post-dummy is significantly larger than the before dummy, this indicates that there is a departure from the general trend (since we control for age per se as we shall return to below).

Additionally, we control for the effect of completed education and parents' education, marriage, income and parents' income, ethnicity and citizenship. The effect of the individual's education and income is well established. Parents' education and income is included even though we control for the direct effect of parents' voting. It may be that resourceful parents provide their children with competences that limit the cost of voting, irrespective of their own voting behavior. This is in line with Plutzer (2002:54) who conclude that parental socioeconomic and political resources largely determine the turnout of first-time-voters. As for ethnicity, minorities often participate substantially less than the majority population (e.g. Verba & Nie 1972:161; Togeby 1999; 2008).

Finally, we include the individuals age in days older than 18 (as well as age^2) in order to take into account the effect of age per se, which most existing studies find have an independent impact, irrespective of the specification (Wass 2007).

Results – Leaving the nest and the social act of voting

We divide our analysis into two parts. First, we examine all young adults in order to examine H1-H3 on parental effects and leaving home. In the second part of the analysis, we restrict our attention to those young adults not living at home in order to inform H4 about the relative effect of parents' and peer groups.

Leaving the nest and the influence of parents on their offspring

Table 1 presents the models for all young adults with parents in the sample (see the appendix, Table A1, for descriptive statistics).[6] The first model only includes main effects whereas the second and third also includes various interactions.

[6] This implies that two groups drops out of the sample. The first group are those where at least one of the parents do not live in any of the 44 municipalities, for which we have complete turnout information (40,667). This may mean that we have an overrepresentation of individuals that move within a municipality compared to between municipality movers. If anything this should suppress a negative finding of leaving the nest. Since we do have socio-demographical information for all living citizens, we re-estimated the model excluding the parental turnout variables for the full sample and for the sample used in Table 1. The results were almost identical, with slightly more negative effects of leaving the nest in the full sample (as expected). None of the other variables of interest yielded substantially different results. The second group are those where at least one of the parents are dead or is not eligible in the country (9,228). We can include this group by excluding all parental variables. Again the coefficients were almost identical with slightly higher negative coefficients of leaving the nest in the model that includes young adults with dead parents.

Table 1: Logit model on turnout - Eligible voters under 22 years old (2009)

	(1)		(2)	(3)
	Logistic coef.	+/- ½ SD % / 0-1	Logistic coef.	Logistic coef.
Mother voted	1,28***	14 / 30	0,94***	1,26***
	(0,02)		(0,03)	(0,06)
Father voted	0,76***	8 / 19	0,47***	0,63***
	(0,02)		(0,03)	(0,06)
Lives with mother	0,24***	3 / 6	-0,38***	-0,33***
	(0,02)		(0,04)	(0,04)
Lives with father	0,12***	2 / 3	-0,31***	-0,29***
	(0,02)		(0,03)	(0,03)
Mother voted*lives with mother	-	-	0,83***	0,75***
			(0,04)	(0,04)
Father voted*lives with father	-	-	0,55***	0,52***
			(0,04)	(0,04)
Mother voted*male	-	-	-0,30***	-0,29***
			(0,04)	(0,04)
Father voted*male	-	-	0,10**	0,10**
			(0,04)	(0,04)
Age*mother voted	-	-	-	-0,73***
				(0,18)
Age^2*mother voted	-	-	-	0,35**
				(0,12)
Age*father voted	-	-	-	-0,35*
				(0,17)
Age^2*father voted	-	-	-	0,15
Current, ongoing education (base=none)				(0,12)
Primary school	0,06	0 / 2	0,06	0,06
	(0,05)		(0,05)	(0,05)
High school	0,70***	9 / 17	0,71***	0,71***
	(0,02)		(0,02)	(0,02)
Technical education	0,09***	1 / 2	0,10***	0,10***
	(0,02)		(0,02)	(0,02)
Higher education (4 years or below)	0,32***	2 / 8	0,32***	0,31***
	(0,04)		(0,04)	(0,04)
Higher education (5 years or above)	0,17	0 / 4	0,24	0,24
	(0,69)		(0,67)	(0,67)
Residential stability (in 1,000 days on address)	0,03***	2 / -	0,02***	0,02***
	(0,00)		(0,00)	(0,00)
Municipal stability (in 1,000 days in municipality)	0,03***	2 / -	0,03***	0,03***
	(0,00)		(0,00)	(0,00)
Birthday in the 4 weeks before EP election	-0,15**	-1 / -4	-0,14**	-0,14**
	(0,05)		(0,05)	(0,05)
Birthday in the 4 weeks after EP election	0,09	0 / 2	0,10	0,10
	(0,05)		(0,05)	(0,05)
Birthday in the 4 weeks before FT election	-0,04	0 / -1	-0,04	-0,04
	(0,06)		(0,06)	(0,05)
Birthday in the 4 weeks after FT election	0,02	0 / 1	0,02	0,02
	(0,05)		(0,05)	(0,05)
Sex (male)	-0,17***	-2 / -4	-0,02	-0,02
	(0,02)		(0,04)	(0,04)
Age in 1,000 days	-1,37***	-	-1,40***	-0,59***
	(0,08)		(0,08)	(0,17)
Age in 1,000 days^2	0,66***	-	0,69***	0,31**
	(0,05)		(0,05)	(0,11)

Education, completed (base= primary school)				
High school	0,68***	7 / 17	0,71***	0,71***
	(0,03)		(0,03)	(0,03)
Technical education	0,35***	1 / 9	0,37***	0,36***
	(0,07)		(0,06)	(0,06)
Higher education (4 years or below)	0,76	0 / 18	0,89	0,89
	(0,79)		(0,77)	(0,76)
Income in 100,000 DKK	-0,10***	-2 / -	-0,10***	-0,10***
	(0,02)		(0,02)	(0,02)
Married	0,20	0 / 5	0,16	0,14
	(0,16)		(0,16)	(0,15)
Non-Danish, Western ethnicity	-0,23*	0 / -6	-0,22	-0,22*
	(0,11)		(0,11)	(0,11)
Non-Danish, non-Western ethnicity	-0,44***	-3 / -11	-0,43***	-0,43***
	(0,04)		(0,04)	(0,04)
Non-Danish, Western citizen	-0,06	0 / -1	-0,02	-0,02
	(0,12)		(0,12)	(0,12)
Non-Danish, non-Western citizen	0,12*	0 / 2	0,13*	0,13*
	(0,06)		(0,06)	(0,06)
Mother's education, completed (base= primary school)				
High school	0,06	0 / 1	0,06	0,06
	(0,04)		(0,04)	(0,04)
Technical education	-0,01	0 / 0	0,00	0,00
	(0,02)		(0,02)	(0,02)
Higher education (4 years or below)	0,19***	2 / 5	0,20***	0,20***
	(0,02)		(0,02)	(0,02)
Higher education (5 years or above)	0,34***	2 / 9	0,36***	0,36***
	(0,04)		(0,04)	(0,04)
Mother's income in 100,000 DKK	-0,00	0 / -	-0,00	-0,00
	(0,00)		(0,00)	(0,00)
Father's education, completed (base= primary school)				
High school	0,08*	0 / 2	0,09*	0,09*
	(0,04)		(0,04)	(0,04)
Technical education	-0,02	0 / 0	-0,01	-0,01
	(0,02)		(0,02)	(0,02)
Higher education (4 years or below)	0,13***	1 / 3	0,14***	0,14***
	(0,02)		(0,02)	(0,02)
Higher education (5 years or above)	0,30***	2 / 7	0,30***	0,30***
	(0,03)		(0,03)	(0,03)
Father's income in 100,000 DKK	-0,00	0 / -	-0,00	-0,00
	(0,00)		(0,00)	(0,00)
Constant	-1,71***	-	-1,25***	-1,61***
	(0,04)		(0,05)	(0,07)
N / McFadden's R^2	95,911/0.17		95,911/0.18	95,911/0.18
Log Likelihood / Chi^2	-55,050/ 15,767		-54,562/17,150	-54,534/17,398

*p<0.05,**p< 0.01,***p< 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by household. The effect sizes in column 2 depicts the percentage change from changing the variable in question a half standard deviation below to a half standard deviation above the mean with other variables held at their mean (age^2 held at the mean of age squared). "0-1" is the effect of a 1 on a dummy variable compared to the reference category.

Model 1 in Table 1 provides strong evidence of H1, namely that if parents vote, it is more likely that the young individual will do so as well (and opposite). As depicted by the predicted probabilities, if the father votes compared to a non-voting dad, it will increase the

young adult's turnout by 19 percentage points when all other variables in the model are held at their mean.[7] If the mother turns out, the effect is about 30 percentage points.[8] Mothers matter more than fathers. This may be because women on average still are more in contact with their children during their primary socialization.

Model 1 also provides evidence that leaving home contributes to the turnout decline among youngsters. If living with the father, the probability to vote increase with 3 percentage points compared to have left him. This number is 6 percentage points if living with the mother. The results are surprising in the light of the findings of the (few) previous studies on the topic which finds a moderate negative effect (Highton & Wolfinger 2001). Again the mother has the strongest effect on young adults' turnout. It should be noted that the effect of leaving home occurs even though residential mobility is controlled for. Thus, the total effect of moving from your parents is even higher, since leaving the nest also implies a shift in residence.

From H1 and H2 we saw that parents matter and moving from them matter as well. However, might moving have different consequences for different people? In model 2, interactions are included in order to evaluate Hypothesis 3. Since interaction terms in logistic regression are notoriously difficult to interpret, Figure 4 provides the predicted likelihood of voting for various groups when all other variables are held at their means.

[7] For the sake of simplicity, we did not include interactions between the two parents. The interaction between lives with mother and lives with father is substantially very small and has a negative tendency. The interaction between father voted and mother voted is also negative, and the main effects increase. This implies that it is particularly important that the young adult is subjected to the voting norm from at least one of the parents. However, one does not get the full double effect when both vote.

[8] One cannot preclude that the young adult can also affect the parents' turnout by her own participation (endogeneity). However, one would expect parents to have a stronger effect on their offspring than the other way around. Otherwise one would also expect parents with kids at home to vote less than other married couples which is not the case.

Figure 4: The predicted probabilities for turnout under different conditions (percent) when all other variables are held at their means



Model 2 and Figure 4 reveals an interesting pattern. The main effect of living at home is positive, while there is a very strong interaction between the parent vote variables and living at home. In other words, if the parents are not voting, living with them decreases the likelihood of voting. If the parents are voting, the positive effect of living with them is quite substantial. This effect is illustrated in Figure 4, where the differences between the blue bars (no parents voting) and the purple ones (both parents voting) is substantially larger, when the young individual lives with both parents compared to none of the parents. The results strongly support H3 and make intuitive sense, since young adults who are not living at home are affected by their parents by primary socialization but only to a limited extent are confronted by their parents' decision to vote in the election in question. In other words, part of parents influence on the children stem from socialization and part stems from living in the same house, since voting is also a social phenomenon. The results also correspond

nicely to Figure 3 where the affect of parental voting declines dramatically around the time the child moves and then levels out. Model 3 also reveals that the conclusion cannot be explained by parents' influence on their children declining by age per se.

In addition to the main hypotheses, Model 2 and Figure 4 show that while mothers on average influence her children more than the fathers, the size of the difference in conditional on the sex of her children. The interaction between father voted and whether the young adult was a male is positive while it is negative for boys and their mothers. This may be because the young adults are relatively more influenced by their own sexes as role models. Since the positive father*male interaction is smaller than the negative mother*male interaction, females are slightly more influenced by their parents than males.

The models in Table 1 also indicate that turning 18 year old just before the previous election has a negative impact on turnout in the next election and just missing the past election has a positive impact on turnout in the next. The reason may be that the last election before the one under investigation was a European Parliament Election which is a low salient, second order election (Franklin & Hobolt 2010). Another explanation would be that there is certain "hype" about being able to vote for the first time (see Toka 2009 for a more general argument on the entertainment value of voting). That is, the focus from the young voters as well as her peers on the election is much stronger if young voters just have turned 18 years old before the election and therefore have not experienced all the other consequences of turning 18 (military duty, driving license etc.) yet. At the second last election, the higher saliency national parliament election, there is no deviation from the age-turnout trend.

Residential mobility matter even though there are no registration costs in Denmark. This is in accordance with the work of Highton (2000) that moving itself can lower turnout due to distribution of community ties. We also find evidence that moving constituency has an influence. This indicates that the finding by Highton (2000) is partly a consequence of societal ties and party due to familiarity with the political system being a function of residential stability.

Being a student and thus being part of an educational community provide easy access to political information, but it also strong focus point for social network and social pressure to turnout compared to be more socially isolated if not engaged in education (Rosenstone & Wolfinger 1980: 57).[9] Exactly that is what we find. Students vote more than non-students. Furthermore, technical education provides the weakest influence whereas higher education provides the strongest influence. This is in accordance with Hillygus (2005)'s findings that different types of education have different impact on political participation.

A final interesting result is that there is some direct effect of the parents' socio-economic background – i.e. children of highly educated parents vote more than others, even when we take their parents' tendency to vote into account. Thus, parental resources matters irrespective of whether the parents vote themselves.

Age and age^2 are still significant and strong in magnitude, indicating that the models do not explain all of the observed variation in turnout as a function of age. Nevertheless, in model 2, even when age is held constant, the model does predict a 10 percentage points

[9] One should be cautious about interpreting the entire correlation as a causal effect of education, since it is well known that education in cross-sectional analyses can be polluted with large selection effects (see for instance Highton (2009)'s work on education and political information.

drop in turnout between the age of 18 and 21 (compared to a 20 percentage points actual drop).

After leaving the nest: The influence of peers and parents

As should be evident from Table 1 and Figure 4, parents matter and they matter big. It is also clear that when adolescents leave home, their parents matter less and their turnout propensity declines. The two things seem to be related. Turnout may decline when youngster leave the nest because she is less influenced by her parents' (average) high tendency to vote. In Table 2, we consider the influence of peer (household) voting for those individuals who are not living at home and not living alone.

Table 2: Logit model on turnout. Eligible adults below 22 not living at home (2009)

	(4)	
	Logistic coef.	+/- ½ SD % / 0-1
Average household vote	2,62***	29 / -
	(0,044)	
Mother voted	0,68***	8 / 16
	(0,044)	
Father voted	0,42***	5 / 10
	(0,042)	
Current, ongoing education (base=none)		
Primary school	0,15	0 / 4
	(0,15)	
High school	0,42***	4 / 10
	(0,059)	
Technical education	0,039	1 / 1
	(0,051)	
Higher education (4 years or below)	0,090	1 / 2
	(0,066)	
Higher education (5 years or above)	-2,21	-1 / -33
	(1,42)	
Residential stability (in 1,000 days on address)	0,11*	1 / -
	(0,042)	
Municipal stability (in 1,000 days in municipality)	0,029***	2 / -
	(0,0052)	
Birthday in the 4 weeks before EP election	-0,27	-1 / -6
	(0,25)	
Birthday in the 4 weeks after EP election	0,32	1 / 8
	(0,22)	
Birthday in the 4 weeks before FT election	-0,029	0 / -1
	(0,12)	
Birthday in the 4 weeks after FT election	0,0042	0 / 0
	(0,12)	
Sex (male)	-0,21***	-3 / -5
	(0,037)	
Age in 1,000 days	0,14	-
	(0,24)	
Age in 1,000 days^2	-0,053	-
	(0,14)	
N / McFadden's R^2	21,481/0.30	
Log Likelihood / Chi^2	-10,313.8/4973.0	

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p< 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by households. The effect sizes in column 2 depicts the percentage change from changing the variable in question a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard deviation above the mean with all other variables held at their mean (age^2 held at the mean of age squared). "0-1" is the effect of a 1 on a dummy variable compared to the reference category. For the sake of space, we have omitted the following controls: Completed education (3 dummies), married (1 dummy), ethnicity (2 dummies), citizenship (2 dummies), mother's education (4 dummies), mother's income, father's education (4 dummies), father's income, average household age, average household income, average household completed education (4 variables), average household ongoing education (4 variables). The full results are available in the appendix.

Table 2 supports hypothesis 4 by showing the importance of other persons' vote (for instance, a partner or a roommate) in the respondent's new household. One standard deviation in other household members' vote means more than the parents' voting

combined.[10] This is interesting since the members of the new household will rarely be related to the individual by genes or have had influence over them during primary socialization. This indicates that what happens around the election itself may be very important (people in the same household may discuss the election, encourage/discourage each other to vote, or even go to the polls together). The effect is illustrated in the Figure 5 where we vary the average turnout of the household (the respondent herself excluded) when all other variables in the specification are held at their means). As is also clear from Table 2, the effect is substantial.[11]

[10] We cannot, of course, interpret the entire coefficient for household voting as a causal effect, since the respondent herself also affect her peers. However, even if half of the effect is eliminated by reverse causation, peers are still as influential as parents are (the parents coefficients are probably somewhat less affected by the potential endogeneity problem). Selection problems are probably limited due to the wide range of socio-demographical controls. Thus, selection is mainly an issue to the extent that people move in together due unobserved political interest.

[11] We also experimented with an interaction between residential stability and household vote. The effect was positive, but substantially unimportant. This implies that even though the effect of living with someone increases slightly over time, living with someone or not is what matters.

Figure 5: Probability of voting as a function of average turnout in the household (for all other individuals then the respondent herself)



The fact result that parents' influence is substituted with the influence of peers has substantial consequences for youth turnout. The 21,481 young adults included in Table 2 lived in households with average turnouts of 46% compared to 69% turnout among their fathers and 70% among their mothers. That is, when the young adult leave home, her main influences changes from high to low voting individuals. This contributes substantially to the observed turnout decline.

Discussion – leaving the nest as a reconfiguration of the social ties of voting

Young voters enfranchised close to Election Day vote more often that their slightly older peers. We have showed that from the age of 18 until about 20 years, turnout decreases, and do not increase, as suggested by studies that aggregate the turnout for all young adults. No previous study has to our knowledge discussed this surprising pattern, though it seems of more general nature than the present case.

Now why this pattern? Though we do not explain all the age-related variation, a major part of the explanation is residential patterns. At 18, 81% (with living parents) live at home. Four years later, the corresponding figure is only 11%. As the young adults leaves the nest, the parents' positive influence start to wear off. If, for instance, both parents vote, the predicted probability of voting drops 16 percentage points when the young individual leaves home (see Figure 4). At the same time as the parents influence diminishes, the adolescents are heavily influenced by their low voting peers. In other words, this study indicates that the participation norms met by young adults are highly variable across adolescence and not simply low as suggested previously (Plutzer 2002). Hence, while our study does not question previous findings, that above 21 year olds increasingly vote when they start to settle down, having families of their own etc., it does suggest that there is a phase before that – a phase of detachment from the parents in which the likelihood of voting actually decreases.

The result also feeds into the literature on residential mobility. Mobility matters even in this study where there are no registration costs, and this factor thus further adds to the turnout decline among adolescents. This supports the idea that community ties matter. However, even more interestingly, this study implies that a move can mean replacing one primary

reference group with another – in this case from parents to peers. If we do not consider this factor in addition to (in the American system) and disruption of community, we run the risk of biasing the effect of mobility per se. If, for instance, the new reference group has a higher voting propensity than the old one, we would underestimate the effect of mobility per se and vice-versa.

In a theoretical perspective the effect of leaving the nest and the subsequent peer effects are interesting as they indicates that though primary socialization matters, living with someone matters at least as much. Short-term factors seem to matter at least as much as long-term factors. The study can also indirectly feed into the literature on the effect of marriage or other relationships where it is commonly found that "social networks" matter (e.g. Stoker & Jennings 1995). This study goes deeper and suggests that living with someone can be a large part of the reason why close relationship matter. Studying adolescents is an ideal venue for studying this, since we have a natural variation in residency as the young adults leave home (spouses almost always live together, making it difficult to separate the effect the relationship per se and the joint residency). People living together may or may not discuss the upcoming election in their everyday life, and even more importantly, they may go to the polls together. In that sense, voting is essentially a social act.

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Table A1: descriptive statistics for Table 1

	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	N	Data date	Name or register in DST
Voted	0.529	0.499	0	1	95884	11-17-09	-
Mother voted	0.744	0.436	0	1	95884	11-17-09	-
Father voted	0.736	0.441	0	1	95884	11-17-09	-
Lives with mother	0.610	0.488	0	1	95884	11-17-09	bopikom
Lives with father	0.522	0.500	0	1	95884	11-17-09	bopikom
Current, ongoing education (base=none)							
Primary school	0.024	0.154	0	1	95884	01-01-09	igudd
High school	0.388	0.487	0	1	95884	01-01-09	igudd
Technical education	0.209	0.406	0	1	95884	01-01-09	igudd
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.052	0.222	0	1	95884	01-01-09	igudd
Higher education (5 years or above)	0.000	0.011	0	1	95884	01-01-09	igudd
Residential stability (in 1,000 days on address)	2899	2860.9	0	8035	95884	11-17-09	bopa
Municipal stability (in 1,000 days in municipality)	5525	1828.5	0	8035	95884	11-17-09	bopa
Birthday in the 4 weeks before EP election	0.024	0.152	0	1	95884	11-17-09	-
Birthday in the 4 weeks after EP election	0.025	0.156	0	1	95884	11-17-09	-
Birthday in the 4 weeks before FT election	0.019	0.137	0	1	95884	11-17-09	-
Birthday in the 4 weeks after FT election	0.020	0.140	0	1	95884	11-17-09	-
Sex (male)	0.516	0.500	0	1	95884	11-17-09	-
Age in 1,000 days	0.695	0.418	0	1.46	95884	11-17-09	-
Education, completed (base=primary school)							
High school	0.188	0.391	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Technical education	0.014	0.117	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.000	0.009	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Income in 100,000 DKK	0.487	0.523	-7	43	95884	01-01-09	perindkialt
Married	0.002	0.047	0	1	95884	01-01-09	civst
Non-Danish, Western ethnicity	0.006	0.077	0	1	95884	01-01-09	ietype
Non-Danish, non-Western ethnicity	0.080	0.271	0	1	95884	01-01-09	ietype
Non-Danish, Western citizen	0.005	0.074	0	1	95884	01-01-09	statkode
Non-Danish, non-Western citizen	0.029	0.167	0	1	95884	01-01-09	Statkode
Mother's education, completed (base=primary school)							
High school	0.052	0.223	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Technical education	0.369	0.483	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.296	0.457	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (5 years or above)	0.068	0.252	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Mother's income in 100,000 DKK	3.173	2.824	-5	597	95884	01-01-07	perindkialt
Father's education, completed (base=primary school)							
High school	0.050	0.218	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Technical education	0.411	0.492	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.208	0.406	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (5 years or above)	0.110	0.313	0	1	95884	01-01-09	hfudd
Father's income in 100,000 DKK	4.601	7.444	-201	524	95884	01-01-07	perindkialt

Table A2: descriptive statistics for Table 2 and A3

	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	N	Data date	Variable in DST
Voted	0.427	0.495	0	1	22390	11-17-09	-
Average household vote	0.481	0.448	0	1	22390	11-17-09	-
Mother voted	0.693	0.461	0	1	22390	11-17-09	-
Father voted	0.688	0.463	0	1	22390	11-17-09	-
Current, ongoing education (base=none)							
Primary school	0.015	0.121	0	1	22390	01-01-09	igudd
High school	0.194	0.395	0	1	22390	01-01-09	igudd
Technical education	0.196	0.397	0	1	22390	01-01-09	igudd
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.108	0.311	0	1	22390	01-01-09	igudd
Higher education (5 years or above)	0.000	0.015	0	1	22390	01-01-09	igudd
Residential stability (in 1,000 days on address)	295.1	405.7	0	7949	22390	11-17-09	bopa
Municipal stability (in 1,000 days in municipality)	6374.3	2488.2	0	8035	22390	11-17-09	bopa
Birthday in the 4 weeks before EP election	0.007	0.086	0	1	22390	11-17-09	-
Birthday in the 4 weeks after EP election	0.008	0.088	0	1	22390	11-17-09	-
Birthday in the 4 weeks before FT election	0.021	0.144	0	1	22390	11-17-09	-
Birthday in the 4 weeks after FT election	0.020	0.140	0	1	22390	11-17-09	-
Sex (male)	0.417	0.493	0	1	22390	11-17-09	-
Age in 1,000 days	0.931	0.368	0	1.46	22390	11-17-09	--
Education, completed (base= primary school l)							
High school	0.341	0.474	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Technical education	0.026	0.158	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.000	0.016	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Income in 100,000 DKK	0.667	0.597	-0.065	42.5	22390	01-01-07	perindkialt
Married	0.007	0.083	0	1	22390	01-01-09	Civst
Non-Danish, Western ethnicity	0.006	0.077	0	1	22390	01-01-09	ieland
Non-Danish, non-Western ethnicity	0.117	0.321	0	1	22390	01-01-09	ieland
Non-Danish, Western citizen	0.006	0.079	0	1	22390	01-01-09	statkode
Non-Danish, non-Western citizen	0.043	0.203	0	1	22390	01-01-09	statkode
Mother's education, completed (base= primary school)							
High School	0.052	0.221	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Technical education	0.349	0.477	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.270	0.444	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (5 years or above)	0.065	0.247	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Mother's income in 100,000 DKK	3.031	4.343	-3.070	597.0	22390	01-01-07	perindkialt
Father's education, completed (base=primary school)							
High school	0.050	0.217	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Technical education	0.395	0.489	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.190	0.392	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (5 years or above)	0.104	0.306	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Father's income in 100,000 DKK	4.287	7.165	-20.06	323.5	22390	01-01-07	hfudd
Average household age	28.932	12.188	18	99	22390	11-17-09	bopikom
Average household income in 100,000 DKK	1,552	1,388	-3.878	42.5	22390	01-01-09	perindkialt
Proportion household with a given completed education							
High school	0.290	0.422	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Technical education	0.161	0.303	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.072	0.198	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Higher education (5 years or above)	0.021	0.104	0	1	22390	01-01-09	hfudd
Proportion household with a given ongoing education							
Primary school	0.005	0.054	0	1	22390	01-01-09	igudd
High school	0.098	0.274	0	1	22390	01-01-09	igudd
Technical education	0.116	0.297	0	1	22390	01-01-09	igudd
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.122	0.304	0	1	22390	01-01-09	igudd
Higher education (5 years or above)	0.014	0.101	0	1	22390	01-01-09	igudd

A3: Logit model on turnout. Eligible adults below 22 not living at home (2009). Full model.

	(4)	
	Logistic coef.	+/- ½ SD % / 0-1
Average household vote	2,62***	29 / -
	(0,044)	
Mother voted	0,68***	8 / 16
	(0,044)	
Father voted	0,42***	5 / 10
	(0,042)	
Average household vote*male	0,15	0 / 4
	(0,15)	
Mother voted*male	0,42***	4 / 10
	(0,059)	
Father voted*male	0,039	1 / 1
	(0,051)	
Current, ongoing education (base=none)		
Primary school	0,090	1 / 2
	(0,066)	
High school	-2,21	-1 / -33
	(1,42)	
Technical education	0,11*	1 / -
	(0,042)	
Higher education (4 years or below)	0,029***	2 / -
	(0,0052)	
Higher education (5 years or above)	-0,27	-1 / -6
	(0,25)	
Residential stability (in 1,000 days on address)	0,32	1 / 8
	(0,22)	
Municipal stability (in 1,000 days in municipality)	-0,029	0 / -1
	(0,12)	
Birthday in the 4 weeks before EP election	0,0042	0 / 0
	(0,12)	
Birthday in the 4 weeks after EP election	-0,21***	-3 / -5
	(0,037)	
Birthday in the 4 weeks before FT election	0,14	-
	(0,24)	
Birthday in the 4 weeks after FT election	-0,053	-
	(0,14)	
Sex (male)	2,62***	29 / -
	(0,044)	
Age in 1,000 days	0,68***	8 / 16
	(0,044)	
Age in 1,000 days^2	0,42***	5 / 10
	(0,042)	

Education, completed (base=primary school)		
High school	0,55***	7 / 14
	(0,057)	
Technical education	0,24*	1 / 9
	(0,11)	
Higher education (4 years or below)	-0,90	0 / -6
	(0,92)	
Income in 100,000 DKK	-0,054	-1 / -
	(0,029)	
Married	0,087	0 / 2
	(0,19)	
Non-Danish, Western ethnicity	-0,30	-1 / -7
	(0,26)	
Non-Danish, non-Western ethnicity	-0,36***	-2 / -6
	(0,077)	
Non-Danish, Western citizen	0,14	0 / 4
	(0,25)	
Non-Danish, non-Western citizen	-0,012	0 / -2
	(0,12)	
Mother's education, completed (base=primary school)		
High school	-0,095	0 / -1
	(0,087)	
Technical education	-0,076	0 / 0
	(0,046)	
Higher education (4 years or below)	0,23***	2 / 6
	(0,053)	
Higher education (5 years or above)	0,42***	3 / 11
	(0,090)	
Mother's income in 100,000 DKK	0,0044	1 / -
	(0,0091)	
Father's education, completed (base=primary school)		
High school	0,091	0 / 2
	(0,086)	
Technical education	-0,022	0 / 0
	(0,044)	
Higher education (4 years or below)	0,10	1 / 2
	(0,056)	
Higher education (5 years or above)	0,26***	2 / 6
	(0,076)	
Father's income in 100,000 DKK	-0,0054*	0 / -
	(0,0025)	
Average household age	-0,018***	-5 / -
	(0,0023)	
Average household income in 100,000 DKK	-0,087***	-2 / -
	(0,019)	

Proportion household with a given completed education		
High school	0,046	0 / -
	(0,060)	
Technical education	-0,082	-1 / -
	(0,066)	
Higher education (4 years or below)	0,024	-1 / -
	(0,11)	
Higher education (5 years or above)	0,31	0 / -
	(0,21)	
Proportion household with a given ongoing education		
Primary school	0,046	0 / -
	(0.30)	
High School	-0.068	0 / -
	(0.074)	
Technical education	-0.0096	0 / -
	(0.062)	
Higher education (4 years or below)	0.024	0 / -
	(0.068)	
Higher education (5 years or above)	0.017	0 / -
	(0.19)	
Constant	-2.17***	
	(0.13)	
N / McFadden's R2	21,481/0.30	
Log Likelihood / Chi2	-10,313.8/4973.0	

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by households. The effect sizes in column 2 depicts the percentage change from changing the variable in question a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard deviation above the mean with all other variables held at their mean (age^2 held at the mean of age squared). “0-1” is the effect of a 1 on a dummy variable compared to the reference category.